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AN INTEGRATED JURISPRUDENCE
AND ITS INFLUENCE IN FIGHTING POVERTY
Kevin L. O'Shea*
IWmRODUCTION

Part I of this writing discusses the promulgation of an integrated
jurisprudence which has natural law as its foundation and includes the legal
philosophies of positive law and social utilitarianism. It begins by providing
a general definition of natural law and by discussing how natural law is based
on reason and fundamental fairness.
Section A of Part I states why there is a need for a supplement to natural
law and therefore a need for an integrated jurisprudence. It does so by
discussing how and why people sometimes act contrary to the principles of
natural law in that people have free will and do not always act rationally and
fairly.
Section B of Part I states the general objectives of government and law. It
provides a detailed discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of three legal
theories (natural law, positive law, and social utilitarianism) that strive to bring
about the stated objectives of law.
It concludes by discussing how these theories can be reconciled by
integrating them into one theory with the emphasis on natural law.
Part I discusses historical examples of how the United States Constitution
and its Amendments were formulated under an integrated jurisprudence. In
particular, it discusses three Supreme Court cases that have interpreted the
Constitution and how two of those cases have influenced the fight against
poverty. The third case is the focus of Part II because it concerns education
which is arguably the primary vehicle with which an indigent has to rise from
poverty.' This case further illustrates how the Court's majority sometimes
misapplies the legal philosophy on which the Constitution is based and the
consequences such a misapplication has in fighting poverty.

Member of the class of 1992, District of Columbia School of Law.
I. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 470-71 (1988)(Ma

dissenting).
1,.hall,
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L AN INTEGRATED JURISPRUDENCE WITH AN EMPHASIS
AND FOUNDATION BASED ON NATURAL LAW

For reasons that will be revealed below, the best legal theory to adopt and
implement is an integrated jurisprudence which has natural law as its
cornerstone and also encompasses positive law and social utilitarianism. The
primary emphasis and foundation of an integrated theory should be based on
natural law, because it is underpinned by fundamental fairness and "moral
principles.., derived from reason and conscience."'
Natural law, according to the Stoic school of philosophy,3 is based on the
state of nature and man.4 The Stoics asserted that nature is maintained in a
rational and ordered state by a divine being.5 They further asserted that
because humans have an ability to reason, humans have a special relationship
with the divine being.6 Finally, the Stoics asserted that, due to the rational and
ordered state of nature, there is a "universal and world-wide law governing
man's moral and social relations.""
A. Why We Need Man-Made Laws
1. A Need For A Supplement To Natural Law
Why do we need man-made laws if we have natural law? Why is natural
law in and of itself not enough to govern our relationships with each other?
To answer these questions we need to probe further into the nature of man.
Thus, it is necessary to delve briefly into the field of psychology. The sciences
of jurisprudence and psychology are interconnected in that psychology concerns
itself with the mind and its affect on human behavior and jurisprudence
concerns itself with principles and rules governing behavior.8

2. Berman, Toward an IntegratedJurisprudence: Politics,Morality, History, 76 CAaI. L REV. 779,
780 (1988).
3. The Stoic school of philosophy was founded in Athens around 300 B.C. and 'was influential
throughout the Greco-Roman world up to at least A.D. 200.' 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA BarrANMcA 280 (lth cd.
1990).
4. 0. CHRiSTiE, JuiISPRUDENCe, TEXT AND READINoS ON THE PHILosoPHY o

5.1d
6. i
7. 1d
8. WEas'ER's NEw WORLD DIcToNARY 766 & 1147 (2d .college ed. 1976).

LAw 79 (1973).
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a. Freudian Theory Of Human Nature
The theory of human nature underlying Sigmund Freud's 9 psychoanalytical
method offers a great deal of insight into this query."0 It demonstrates a need
to supplement natural law by showing that a person's behavior is not affected
by reason alone. There are three elements to Freud's theory that interact with
each other in the following manner.
The first component is the id, which is the part of the personality that
operates to satisfy innate drives such as sex, and needs such as food."
The second is the super-ego, which is the conscience. 2 Its function is to
distinguish between what is morally right and morally wrong. 13 Although, in
Freud's opinion the super-ego, in part, 'represents the influence of a person's
childhood," he also believed it had an "innate" quality. 4 For example,
generally when we make choices that are morally correct we acquire a sense
of happiness and peace. When we make choices that are morally wrong we
end up with feelings of guilt, that is, inner conflict, remorse, sorrow, and pain.
If we did not possess a conscience, these mental processes that bring about
these feelings would be meaningless. Because we know that there is a purpose
to all things in nature, we must, therefore, have a conscience.
Finally, the ego is the rational part of the personality's Its function is "to
discover the most favorable and least perilous method of obtaining
satisfaction." 6 It operates to mediate between the id and the super-ego.
Thus, the human mind is not entirely rational. Sometimes the id transcends
the ego and super-ego which is one reason why, although man is in part a
rational and moral being, natural law alone is not enough to govern the
relationships among men.

9. Sigmund Freud (b. 1856, d. 1939) was an 'Austrian neurologist and founder of psychoanalysis." 5
Encyclopedia Britannica 5 (15th ed. 1990).
10. The most influential personality theory of the modem era has been Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic
one.' 5 Encyclopedia Britannica 5 (15th ed. 1990); Cf.R.B. DOWNS. BOOKS THAT C-AED TH WoPD
26 (1983); N.A. HORVATh, PHILOsOPHY 314 (1974); VJ. DERLEOA & LH. JANDA, PERSOlmt. ADjUsTNT.
mm PSYcHoLooY oF EVERYDAY LIFE (2d. ed. 1981); E. Hn..OARD, R.L AwXIN.ON, & R.C. AflUZ.1N,

INTRODUCT"ON TO PsYCHoLoOY 10 (1979). Freud's psychoanalytic theory has had a profound influence,
not only on psychology, but also on philosophy and othe fields as well. N.A. HAMWOTL SUpra; Cf.
Encyclopedia Britannica, supra.
11. S. FREUD, AN OutL N op PsYcHo-AsALYsts 5-6 (trans. J. Strachey 1949).

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

ld at 62.
Id at 62.
Id. at 63.
IM at S.
Id.at 5.
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b. Free Will
Free will is another reason why natural law is not enough to govern human
affairs. It involves making choices between what is morally right and morally
wrong. Because people have the freedom to make choices, we need man-made
laws to protect against those who make the morally wrong choices. One might
argue that there is no such thing as free will. However, logic supports the
argument that it exists: If humans are at all rational then arguably we have the
ability to make judgments. Making judgments presupposes the ability to make
choices which necessarily involves freedom.
2. A Need To Govern Human Activities
This writing has demonstrated that there is a need to enact man-made laws
because we have freedom of choice and we do not always make choices in
accord with proper reason. This is because there are forces, in addition to
reason, that affect our behavior. Therefore, to maintain proper order, to insure
that natural law is applied appropriately in society, the state needs to legislate,
that is, enact man-made laws (positive law).
B. The Objective Of Government And Law
The objective of government and law is to protect the health, safety, and
general welfare of the governed,"7 to effect justice, and maintain peace and
order.18 The law should "let men do freely everything they may" without
infringing upon the rights of others to do the same. 9 In effecting justice, the
law must "enforce rights, and ... restrain or redress ... wrongs. " 2O
C. How To Bring About the Objective of Government and Law
Below is a discussion of four legal theories that strive to bring about one or
more of the objectives of law stated above. The theories are natural law,

17. U.S. CONST. PREAMBLE, and amend. X pursuant to the police powers conferred therein, BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 603 (abridged 5th ed. 1983); M. SHAPIRO, & R. TEsotNi, AMERICAN CONsTnTUiONAL
LAW 4-5 (5th ed. 1979); R. POUND, AN INTRODUCION TO THE PHLLOSOPHY OF LAw 40 (1922).

18. R. POUND, supra note 17, at 33 and 35.
19. ILd.at 40.
20. M. COHEN & F. COHEN, READNs IN JSRiPRUDENCE AND LEOAL PnnosOPHY 386 (1951).
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positive law, social utilitarianism and an integrated theory that includes
elements from the three separate theories.
1. Natural Law
Natural law is based on "moral principles and derived from reason and
conscience."21 Thomas Aquinas" stated in his Summa Theologica that "the
rule and measure of human acts is... reason."' He asserted that 'law is
something pertaining to reason."24
Hugo Grotius' "based his system of international law on 'natural law' as
'the dictate of right reason which points out that a given act, because of its
opposition or conformity with man's rational nature, is either morally wrong
or morally necessary, and accordingly forbidden by God, the author of all
naturel.26
. Thomas Aquinas postulated that God is the author of all nature by arguing
that God was the first cause ("mover") of all that exists.27 He asserted that
"all things that are moved are moved by others, lower things by higher ones
...the stronger move the weaker."28 He further asserted:
Everything... must... have its act of existing from something else.
And since every being which exists through another is reduced, as to its
first cause, to one existing in virtue of itself, there must be some being
which is the cause of the existing of all things because it itself is the act
of existing alone. 29

21. Berman. supra, note 2 at 780.
22. Thomas Aquinas (b. 1224125, d. 1274) is noted for his synthesis of philoophy. theology, and logic.

R.B. DOwNs, supra, note 10 at 168; W.S. SAXIAN, HISTORY OF PHuIo orHY 104 (1968); 25
EtCYmOPE-

BiurAmacA 754 (15th ed. 1990).

23. M CoHN, supra, note 20 at 377.
24. Id.
25. Hugo Grotius (b. 1856, d. 1645) was a 'Dutch jurist and scholar' and *onz of the fist great
contribut[ors] (to] modem international law.* 5 ENCYCLOPDIA BarrccNIA 514 (15th ed. 1990).
26. R. WoRmsER,Tim LAw 510-11 (1949).
27t T. AQuINs, "CoMmIruM OF THEoLooY," TmE PocKEr AQUIN2S 158 (V. Bourke tns

28. Id.
29. 1d. at 159.

1960).
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In addition, "there is a being, God, whose essence is His very act of
existing. " " Thus, everything is reduced to one ultimate mover or cause-God.
Again, the Stoics proffered a similar argument for the existence and basis of
natural law, contending that without a divine being, nature could not be
maintained in an ordered and natural state."2 They further asserted that
because man is a rational being he has a special relationship with the divine
being and that man has his assigned role in the ordered whole. 2 That role
is to be a moral and rational being in order to become a part of the moral
world order." They asserted that morality comes from reason and that by
way of reason we come to know that fairness and morality are needed to
maintain order.'
Cicero 35 based his theory of natural law on "the highest reason, implanted
36
in nature, which commands what ought to be done and forbids its opposite."
Cicero, as well as Aristotle, 37 asserted that reason helps us to make the
"distinction between things just and unjust" and that "legal justice is the
discrimination of the just and unjust."38 What then is justice?
Aristotle provided a good answer. He articulated the meaning of justice in
both The Politics and The Nicomachean Ethics. In The Politics,he stated that
"[e]quality consists of the same treatment of similar persons." 39 In The
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle stated that "[t]he just, then, is the lawful and the
fair, the unjust the unlawful and the unfair."'
He defined fairness and
equality in terms of proportion and the mean between two extremes. "Mhe
just is intermediate between a sort of gain and a sort of loss...; it consists in
having an equal amount before and after [a] transaction."' " "Justice is a kind

30. Id
31.

G. CHRLsTIE, supra, note 4 at 79.

32. Id.
33. Id
34. Id.

35. Cicero (b. 106 B.C., d. 43 B.C.) was a Roman statesman, jurist, and philosopher. 3 ENcYcLoPEDA
BRITANNICA 313 (15th ed. 1990).

36. R. WoRMS~, supra, note 26 at 376.
37. Aristotle (b. 384 B.C., d. 322 B.C.) was 'one of the ... greatest intellectual thinkers produced by
the Greeks.' I ENCYCmOpEDIA BRrrANNIcA 556 (15th ed. 1990).
38. R. WORmsER, supra, note 26 at 374, 377.
39. AmToma, Tm PoLrncs (Book VII), JURIsPRUDENCE, TEXr AND READiNGs oN THE PHILOSOPHY
oF LAw 53 (B. Jowett, trans., G. Christie, reprinted 1973).

40. ARIsToTLE, THE NicomtAcnEAN ETmCs (Book V),JURISPRUDENCE, TEXT AND READINGS ON THE
Pmx.osOPy oF LAw 57 (B. Jowett, trans., G. Christie, reprinted 1973).

41. Id. at 62.
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of mean .m...,42
"Mhe equal [is] an intermediate between the greater and
the lesser... according to arithmetical proportion. " "' Therefore, 'to have too
little is to be unjustly treated; to have too much is to act unjustly.'"
The following example illustrates the practicability of Aristotle's theory.
Suppose, all variables being equal, that two children share a candy bar. Justice
dictates that they should each receive 50 percent; that is the mean. 5 The
mean changes as the variables change. For example, suppose one child
contributed $0.60 to the candy bar and the other child contributed $0.40. All
other variables being equal they should split the candy bar with the former
child receiving sixty percent and the latter receiving forty percent.
Plato's46 The Republic also illustrates how variables affect justice. Plato's
view of justice is also consistent with Aristotle's in that both focus on avoiding
harm to others. The following is an excerpt from Book I of The Republic
wherein Socrates discusses the meaning of justice with his colleagues.
But this very thing justice-are we to say that it is just simply to pay back
what one has received from anyone? Or is it true that this may be
sometimes just and sometimes unjust? For example: Suppose you have
received weapons from a friend when in his right mind, everyone would
say that you should not give such things back if he were mad when he
asked for them. Then it would not be right and just to give them back,
or always to tell the whole truth in such a condition.
...For he certainly does not mean what we were speaking of just
now, to give anything and everything back on demand when the depositor
is not in his right mind; yet the deposit is a debt owed, isn't it?

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.at 64.
Id. at 62.
I4 at 65.
Donald R. Gregory, Professor of Philosophy, Lecture at No. Vs. Comm. College (1983).

46. Plato (b. 428/27 B.C., d. 348)7 B.C.) was a 'Greek philosopher, the second of the great trio of
ancient Greeks-Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.' 9 Encyclopedia Britannica 509 (15th ed. 1990).
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Yes.
But one must by no means give back on demand when the depositor is
not in his right mind?
True, said he.
Then it seems Simonides means something else, something different from
that, when he said it is just to give back what is owed.
No doubt of it, said he, for he believes that friends owe friends something
good, not to do them harm.47
As evinced in the foregoing passage there is a hedonistic element to natural
law theory which is illustrated insofar as the focus was on the absence of harm
because it does not bring us happiness.
In concurring with Plato's and Aristotle's hedonistic views Thomas Aquinas
wrote in his Summa Theologica that "the object of practical reason is the final
end; and the final end of human life is happiness."48 He further stated "that
we call those legal matters just, which are adapted to produce and preserve
happiness . . . for the political community."49 Aristotle asserted that "the
ability to feel pleasure in the doing of virtuous acts and, likewise, to avoid bad
actions because of the pain they brought was the mark of a good man.""
The hedonistic principle is not only consistent with the idea of conscience
but also with that of reason. By nature we are social animals. As Aristotle
pointed out in The Politics, "Nature ... makes nothing in vain, and man is
endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication
of pleasure or pain, and therefore found in other animals . .. , the power of
to set forth the expedient and inexpedient..., the just and
speech is intended
5
the unjust. 1
Because we have the ability to speak and to reason, we are social animals.
Therefore, conscience and reason dictate that in order to maintain harmony and
order within the community, we need to maintain these within ourselves. If
everyone sought to satisfy his own appetite without regard to others, there
would only be chaos and anarchy. The end result would be pain because there
would be no trust among members of society.

47. PLATO,

THE REFuBLIc (Book I), GREAT DiALOGUms OF PLATO 29-30 (W. Rouse, tran. 1956).

48. M. COHEN, supra, note 20 at 378.
49. Id
50. 0. CRIsTZ supra, note 4 at 2. (Note that the idea asserted here is consistent with the discussion
about the super-ego in the section above entitled Freudian Theory of Human Nature, see. IA, 1a).
51. ARISTOTLE, supra, note 39 at 13.
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Moreover, in our endeavor to achieve happiness we move toward that which
is perfect.52 "[P]erfection . . . is the sine qua non of happiness, while
inevitably imperfection results in [at least some degree of dissatisfaction and,
thus, at least some degree of] unhappiness." 5 The more perfect a thing is the
happier we are with it. Also, perfection is the standard by which we judge and
measure things.O It is absolute happiness, justice, and truth." Perfection
is, thus, God-the author of natural law.
John Locke advanced the idea that natural rights flow from natural law.
Locke said, "The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges
everyone: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but
consult it, that all being equal and independent, no one ought to harm another
in his life, health, liberty, or possessions." 57 The American Declaration of
Independence"' furthered Locke's natural rights theory. 59 The second
sentence of the Declaration of Independence reads, "We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of
Happiness. "60 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution also further the idea of natural rights. The Fifth Amendment reads
in part, "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation." 6 The Fourteenth Amendment reads in part, "No State
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."62"

52. AQUINAS, 'ExPosmoN oF ARisTO7LE.s MErAnIYSzcs,

THE POCKEr AQUINAS 145 (V.

Bourke

trans. 1960).
53. W. SAHAxIAN, supra, note 22 at 39, on Stoic philosophy.
54. Id at 98, on the philosophy of Saint Anselm ofCanterbury. Anselxn (b. 1033/34. d. 1109) was the
founder of Scholasticism, a philosophical school of thought that dominated the Middle Ages; he (i]
recognized ... as the originator of the ontological argument for the existence of God....
I Encyclopedia
Britannica 434 (15th ed. 1990).
55. Id
56. John Locke (b. 1632) was 'an initiator of the Enlightenment in England and France [and] an inspirer
of the U.S. Constitution ....
23 ENcYcLpmm, BaThANMNCA 229 (15th ed. 1990).
57. R. WoR,,sni, supra, note 26 at 301. (Note that this is consistent with Aristcales notion ofjustice
as articulated in section IC, 1.)
58. The Declaration of Independence (U.S., 1776).
59. R. WoR.MslM supra, note 26 at 301.
60. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
61. U.S. CoNsr. amend V.
62. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, sec. 1.
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2. Positive Law
Roscoe Pound 3 defied positive law as, "a body of commands of the
sovereign authority in a politically organized society as to how men should
conduct themselves therein.""
Sir William Blackstone'
in his
Commentaries defined positive law (he used the words municipal law) as "a
rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding
what is right and prohibiting what is wrong.""'
Positivism is, thus,
"associated with the idea that law derives its binding quality solely because it
proceeds from the dominant political authority in civil society."6 7 It is also
associated with the idea that the "legal order, however much it might be
influenced by the moral order, is analytically self-contained.""
John Austin's' theory of positivism asserted that:
[Tihere can be no limitations upon the sovereign over his (or its) subjects
because, in Austin's scheme of things, legal limitations imply legal duties
and legal duties, in turn, imply sanctions.The lack of legal limitations on
the sovereign therefore follows because, by definition, a political
sovereign cannot be the subject of legal sanctions.7"
The maxim "the king can do no wrong" and the doctrine of sovereign
immunity were based on this line of thinking.
3. Social Utilitarianism
Social utilitarians see law as "an instrument for maintaining and furthering
civilization""' and of "doling] what is useful and... avoid[ing] what is not

63. Roscoe Pound (b. 1870, d. 1964) was a jurist and educator, and the -chief U.S. advocate of
sociological jurisprudence.' 9 ENcYcLOPED BRITANNiCA 650 (15th ed. 1990).
64. R. POUND, supra, note 17 at 27.
65. Sir William Blackstone (b. 1723, d. 1780) was an 'English jurist who was the author of
Commentaries on the Laws of England, . . . the best known description of the doctrines of English law.'
2 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRfnANNiCA 263 (15th ed. 1990).
66. M. CoHEN, supra, note 20 at 384.
67. 0. CHRISTE, supra, note 4 at 292.
68. Id
69. John Austin (b. 1790, d. 1859) was an English jurist and proponent of positive law. I
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 711 (15th ed. 1990).

70. 0. CHISTIE, supra, note 4 at 293.
71. R. PoUND, supra, note 17 at 23.
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useful."' Like natural law proponents, utilitarians are also hedonistic in that
they view the end of law in terms of the amount of happiness it can effect.
The "'utility' or 'greatest happiness principle' holds that actions are right [and
useful] in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; [or] wrong as they
tend to pioduce the reverse of happiness,' and "that pleasure and freedom from
pain are the only things desirable as ends."'
For John Stuart MillV utilitarianism includes the "maxims of equality and
impartiality" in that it is expedient to the promotion of happiness and justice
to give "to each what they deserve."75 However, a dilemma is created by
Mill's utilitarian theory. On the one hand he states that everyone has an "equal
claim to all the means of happiness. 76" Yet, on the other hand, the equality
of treatment is subject to social expediency."
To some extent this dilemma is reconciled by Roscoe Pound's theory of
interests. Pound saw the law as a means of social control, and a tool for
classifying, measuring, and recognizing interests."' "Conflicts or competition
between interests arise because of the competition" between or among
"individuals" and "groups."' "[I]f interests are to be compared and balanced
they must be put on the same scale; i.e. social interests cannot be balanced
against individual interests but only against other social interests. " '
Accordingly, if one wishes to balance an asserted individual interest in freedom
of speech against a social interest in public order, the former must first be
converted to a social interest, for example, by showing that "free speech
informs and educates voters, and thus it is a foundation of a democratic selfgovernment." 8
However, Pound's theory of interests is only useful in resolving the
aforementioned dilemma if one is willing to accept that there is social utility
in the idea of equal and impartial treatment for all. The argument that there
is social utility in equal and impartial treatment for all is that if one were not

72. G. CQuslm supra, note 4 at 293.
73. LS.MiL, U"TnARLSM 7 (ed. George Sher 1979).

74. John Stuart Mill (b. 1806) was a prominent British philosopher and economist of tde nineteemh
century. 24 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 100 (15th ed. 1990).

75. J.S. Mil.,supra, note 73 at 59-60.
76. Id. at 61.
77. Id. at 61-2.
78. R. PoUND, MY PNasorpwy oF LAw 260 (1941).

79. Id
80. G. CHRISE, supra, note 4 at 642. on Roscoe Pound's Lheory.
81. D. CRAtP, E. GRESSMAN & s. RES, CASES AND MATERALs Ox Co.TrrrtmOAL LAw 780
(1989).
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judged by one's ability to produce a certain thing, but rather, by some other
criteria having nothing to do with their ability, then legal decisions would be
made arbitrarily and then the integrity and trust of the legal system would be
in jeopardy.
4. Reconciling The Various Theories-An Integrated Approach.
"Natural law provides a systematic classification as well as predictability in
accordance with the abstract principles chosen. " ' Natural law has "universal
validity in that it sets justified prescriptive requirements or precepts for the
conduct of all human beings and stands as the most basic criteria of moral
rightness. In effect, natural law theory is self-authenticating and selflegitimating providing its own valuation. " " This is so because it is based on
reason and fundamental fairness.
Positive law is needed because we have freedom of choice, and we do not
always make choices in accord with proper reason. This is because there are
forces in addition to reason, for example the id, which affect our behavior.
Therefore, to maintain proper order in society and to insure that natural law is
applied the state needs to enact man-made laws (positive law). Positive law
is needed to protect members of society. from those who seek to 'satisfy their
own desires without regard to the natural rights of other members of society.
However, just as positive law is needed to protect members of society from
potential abuse of other members of society, it must also provide protection to
citizens from potential abuse from the state as well. As was concluded in the
discussion of natural law the principles of reason and conscience, on which
natural law is based, dictate that laws should be founded on principles of
justice and fairness, not arbitrariness and not for the sole good of those in
power. Thus, positive law needs to be limited to the extent that it provides
protection for the natural rights of the citizens of the state and, thus, protects
them against arbitrary state action.
The application of John Locke's social contract theory can help secure these
rights. His social contract theory was used in the writing of the American
Declaration of Independence,8 ' which states in part:

82. McCauliff, Constitutional Jurisprudence of History and Natural Law: Complementary or Rival
Modes of Discourse? 24 CALIF. W. L REv. 333 (1988).
83. Id.
84. R. Wo1umsER, supro, note 26 at 301.
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That to secure these rights (to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness],
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from
the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or
to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on
such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."
With regard to social utilitarianism, positive law is needed to implement and
secure public needs, for example to maintain some semblance of order and
safety, traffic laws need to be implemented. An example of how social
utilitarian theory is already integrated with natural law theory is seen in the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Therein it states that no
"private property [shall] be taken for public use, without just compensation. "
Thus, under the natural law principle of equity it is not fair for the state to take
one's property for public use (that is, to take property for the greater happiness
of the greater number, for example to construct a public road) without giving
the one whose property is taken fair and adequate compensation.
Another example of how social utilitarian theory can integrate with natural
law is the one stated above with regard to free speech (under the heading
entitled Social Utilitarianism). That is, people have the natural right--o speak
freely (as evinced by the First Amendment). That right has social benefits in
that the communication of ideas can help improve society. However, the right
to free speech needs to be balanced against the other social interest in keeping
the peace.

I.

EXAMPLES OF How AN INTEGRATED LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
IS USED IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS

INFLUENCE IN FIGHTING POVERTY

The following presents three examples of how the United States Constitution
is founded on an integrated jurisprudence. In particular, it discusses three
Supreme Court decisions which have interpreted the Constitution and how two
of those decisions have had an influence in fighting poverty.
The third

85. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
86. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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decision is the focus of Part II because it concerns education and education is
perhaps the main vehicle an indigent has to rise from poverty." This third
decision illustrates how the majority of the Court sometimes misapplies the
legal philosophy upon which the Constitution is based and the consequences
such a misapplication has in fighting poverty.
The first example concerns itself with the right to legal counsel in criminal
prosecutions and the interplay of natural law, positive law and social
utilitarianism.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in part, "In
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . ..to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.""' This aspect of the Constitution is
premised on natural law in that a right to legal counsel "is fundamental and
essential to- a fair trial."' 9 The Constitutional right of state governments to
impose criminal sanctions and create procedures to prosecute those accused of
criminal offenses is, in part, based on positive law. The Tenth Amendment
reserves those powers not delegated to the federal government in the
Constitution to the states. However, the power of the states to enact man-made
laws (i.e., positive law) is limited by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill
of Rights, and in this instance, natural law.
In Gideon v. Wainwright, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment, by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that an indigent
defendant in a state criminal prosecution has 1he right to have legal counsel
appointed for him." Gideon provides one example of how the United States
is founded on an integrated jurisprudence and its affect in fighting poverty.
The aforementioned natural and positive law theories are also integrated with
the social utilitarian theory because there is a general social need for law and
order and at the same time there is a social interest in maintaining integrity and
fairness in our judicial system.
The second example concerns itself with the Social Security Act and Due
Process, and on how an integrated jurisprudence affects the same.
The Social Security Act is a product of positive law, i.e., it is an act of the
legislature. The U.S. Constitution conferred Congress with authority to pass
91 Article 1, Section 8 illustrates how
the act pursuant to Article 1, Section 8.

87. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 487. U.S. 450, 470-471 (1988)(Marshall, J.. disenting).
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the social utilitarian theory is integrated with positive law theory in that it gives
Congress the power to tax and spend for the general welfare of the
governed.
Natural law is integrated since a state may not withdraw a
statutory entitlement to welfare benefits without procedural due process of law
pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the Supreme
Court held in Goldberg v. Kelly,9 that, pursuant to the Due Process Clause,
one has a right to a pre-termination evidentiary hearing before welfare
entitlements can be discontinued. The Due Process Clause was founded on
natural law principles in that it imports fairness. To deprive one of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law would be fundamentally unfair.
The third example concerns itself with Equal Protection and education, and
the interplay of an integrated jurisprudence.
One of the primary obstacles of an indigent's ability to rise from poverty is
the poor and unequal public education systems of which many are a product.
Education often provides the only avenue an indigent has to overcome
poverty.'
The Fourteenth Amendment reads in part, "No State shall . . . deny any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."93 This equal
protection component of the Fourteenth Amendment is based on natural law,
i.e., fundamental fairness. The Equal Protection Clause "was designed to
prevent any person or class from being singled out as a special subject of
hostile or discriminating legislation. '
It, thus, imposes a limitation on the
positive law state legislatures can enact. Equal protection "means that no
person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances in their
lives, liberty, property, and in their pursuit of happiness. '
However, the
Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted as "not intendting] to take from
the states the right and power to classify the subjects of legislation. It does not
prohibit ... classification, provided such classification ... is based on proper
and justifiable distinctions,... and is not a subterfuge to shield one class or
unduly... burden another or to oppress unlawfully in its administration. 3
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The Supreme Court has used various tests to determine whether or not
statutes encroach upon this constitutional guarantee. The Court used a strict
level of judicial scrutiny when a statute affects a fundamental right or a suspect
class." Under the strict scrutiny test the state must justify its action by
showing that the statute is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state
interesL1° "Classifications based on the following have been held to be
suspect: alienage...; nationality... ; (and] race .... .,lot
The Court has defined a suspect class as one which has been "saddled with
such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.""°
Although the poor fit within the definition of a suspect class the Court has held
that they are not, and that there is not a fundamental right to, or interest in,
education." The poor necessarily fit within the parameters set by the Court
because, by definition, they are a class saddled with economic disabilities.
Also, people with political power are those who are generally well educated
and not poor. They have the means to achieve and maintain political power.
Thus, the poor have been "relegated to a position of political powerlessness."
Moreover, children who live in poor districts have had a purposeful
history of
°
unequal school funding relative to children of wealthy districts.1 i
At the other end of the spectrum of judicial scrutiny the Court uses a
"rational basis test" which it has used in this same context. 05 Under this test
if a statute is "rationally related to (a] legitimate governmental objective" then
the statute does not encroach upon the Equal Protection Clause.'0 6 The Court
presumes the validity of the statute."° The Court almost always finds a
statute as being rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective and
will usually only declare the statute unconstitutional when it is "without any

99. Id at 750.
100. San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,16 (1973).
101. BARRON'S LAW DICrIONARY 157 (2d ed., 1984).

102. San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 28.
103. The Court uses the terms fundamental 'right' and fundamental 'interest' interchangeably in ti
context-particularly in San Antonio.
104. States have varied, and continue to 'vary, the quality of education which (they] offerJ ...
children
in accordance with the amount of taxable wealth located in the school districts in which they reside.' San
Antonio, 411 U.S. at 70 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
105. Id.
106. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 455.
107. San Antonio, at 44.

AN INTEORATED JURISPRUDENCE

reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary."' ' Thus, it is rare to be
able to challenge the constitutionality of a statute under this level of judicial
review.
There is a third level of judicial review that the Court refused to use in an
equal protection challenge by the poor with regard to charging a transportation
fee to students within certain public school districts.' 9 This is an
intermediate or 'heightened' level of scrutiny. In u[a]pplying a heightened
level of equal protection scrutiny . . . the State . . . (must] show that its
classification advance[s] a substantial state interest."" 0
The leading case on this issue is San Antonio v. Rodriguez.. where the
U.S. Supreme Court held that a state's use of a local property tax to fund
public schools did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment even though it discriminated against children in poor school
districts by providing those in wealthier districts with a higher quality
education." 2 It is worth noting that there were four dissenting justices in that
case.
The problem with American jurisprudence in this case is not the constitution
or legal philosophy, of the system, but rather, the majority's interpretation of
its Constitution (and its Amendments). As stated above, the Equal Protection
Clause is grounded on natural. law. It should, therefore, be interpreted with
natural law principles in mind. In San Antonio the majority seems to have
entirely dismissed the natural law principles of fairness and equality which the
Amendment speaks to on its face. Instead, they allow positive law principles
to override the very thing the framers of the Amendment intended to prohibit.
As Justice Marshall points out in his dissenting opinion, this holding is contrary
to that in Brown v. Board of Education where the "Court held . . . , the
opportunity of education, 'where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms'. "
In San Antonio the majority used the rational basis test to validate the state's
action. Assuming arguendo,that the Court used the correct standard ofjudicial
review, its decision is still in error. The majority found that there was a
rational relationship between discriminating between wealthy and poor districts
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and the right of the state to give control of education to localities." 4
However, as Justice Marshall pointed out:
[E]ven if we accept [the state's] general dedication to local control in
educational matters it is difficult to find any evidence of such dedication
with respect to fiscal matters. It ignores reality to suggest-as the Court
does . . . that the local property tax element of the [state] financing
scheme reflects a conscious legislative effort to provide school districts
with local fiscal control ....
mhe quality of educational opportunity
offered by any particular district is largely determined by the amount of
taxable property located in the district-a factor over which local voters
can exercise no control." 5
Thus, there is no rational relationship between a state's action and the
discrimination based on the classification of those children living in districts
according to wealth or lack thereof. The funding scheme is really a subterfuge
to shield one class and unduly burden another." 6
The Court should have used strict judicial scrutiny in deciding this case.
First, it should have found that education is a fundamental right. The majority
even agreed that, "the grave significance of education both to the individual
and to our society cannot be doubted."" 7 It is even mandated by the state
constitutions of 48 of the 50 states."" A right does not have to be explicit
in the U.S. Constitution to be a fundamental right." 9 For example, "the right
to vote in state elections has been recognized as a fundamental political
right."' 20 It is a "constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on
an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction..' 2' Similarly, although
the right to education is not an explicit right in the Constitution, because the
nexus is so great between it and the ability to "participate effectively and
intelligently in our open political system," and between it and First Amendment
freedoms, the Court should have found that it is a fundamental interest.'2
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Assuming, arguendo, that the Court was correct in deciding that there is not
a fundamental interest in education, it nevertheless, should have found that the
poor are a suspect class and, thus, subjected the school funding scheme to strict
judicial scrutiny on that basis. As discussed above, the poor necessarily fit into
the Court's definition of a suspect class. Justice Marshall lends further support
to this proposition by stating that:
A statute that erects special obstacles to education in the path of the poor
naturally tends to consign such persons to their current disadvantaged
status. By denying equal opportunity to exactly those who need it most,
the law not only militates against the ability of each poor child to advance
herself or himself but also increases the likelihood of the creation of a
discrete and permanent underclass. Such a statute is difficult to reconcile
with the framework of equality embodied in the Equal Protection
1
Clause. 2
Under the strict scrutiny standard, the state funding scheme would have been
held to have violated the Equal Protection Clause. The majority even noted
that the state in this case conceded that its discriminatory funding scheme could
not withstand strict judicial scrutiny' 24 .This Is so because the state's funding
scheme was not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.
Likewise, if an intermediate or "heightened' level of judicial scrutiny had
been used by the majority the state funding scheme would have been held to
have violated the Equal Protection Clause. However, this level of judicial
scrutiny is usually reserved for cases involving discriminatory classifications
based on sex or illegitimacy.'2 Notwithstanding these reservations, the Court
did use this standard of review in a subsequent case where they upheld the
right of children of illegal aliens to receive a free public education which had
been made available to other children. 26 This intermediate standard of
review was not used in San Antonio even though both cases involved the denial
of equal protection in public education and a class of disadvantaged children.
In fact, in a still later decision the Court refused to use this standard where
a state allowed local school boards to charge children a user fee for bus
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service."' Not surprisingly, like San Antonio, there were four dissents. In
one of the dissents, again, Justice Marshall pointed out that in the case
involving children of illegal aliens the Court did not rest its decision on that
basis. Rather, it "made clear that the infirmity of the [state] law stemmed from
its differential treatment of a discrete and disadvantaged group of children with
respect to the provision of education. " sl
In summary, the natural law principles of fairness, upon which the Equal
Protection Clause is based, dictate that the state should provide education to its
children on equal terms. The Equal Protection Clause "mandates nothing less
than that 'all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike'."12 9 The
integration of social utilitarianism is in harmony with the natural law theory as
applied here in that it is useful for the common good of society for all its
members to be well educated. A well educated populous means a people who
are more capable of solving societal problems. Because the Equal Protection
Clause is grounded on natural law the Court should have interpreted it in San
Antonio with natural law principles paramount over positive law. Instead its
decision destroyed the import of the Equal Protection Clause by declaring as
valid the state's school funding scheme which was so manifestly unequal in its
allocation between children of wealthy and poor districts when there was no
rational relationship between the means and the result.
Moreover, because the rational relationship test which the Court used
presumes the validity of the statute and assumes as rational almost any
connection between the means and the result of the state's action, and because
this case involved an important fundamental interest and discriminated against
a disadvantaged (thus, suspect) class of persons, the Court should have used a
strict, or at least an intermediate, level of judicial scrutiny. To reiterate what
Justice Marshall had stated:
A statute that erects special obstacles to education in the path of the poor
naturally tends to consign such persons to their current disadvantaged
status. By denying equal opportunity to exactly those who need it the
most, the law not only militates against the ability of each poor child to
advance herself or himself but also increases the likelihood of the creation
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of a discrete and permanent underclass. Such a statute is difficult to
reconcile with the framework of equality embodied in the Equal
Protection Clause."3
The Court once stated in a criminal case that, "There can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he
has."13 ' Likewise, there can be no equal justice where the kind of public
education a child gets depends on the amount of money his parents has. Two
children on equal footing, except that one lives in a wealthy district (a factor
in which a child has virtually no control), must be treated alike by the state.
To do otherwise is wholly inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause and
natural law upon which the Equal Protection Clause is founded.
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